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I. INTRODUCTION, SNIADACH-WAGE GARNISHMENT
In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation of Bay View,' the
United States Supreme Court invalidated the Wisconsin statutory
procedure for garnishment of wages before judgment, on grounds
that the debtor was denied due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution because her property
(i.e. wages) had been seized prior to her being given notice and
an opportunity to be heard on the question of the probable vali-
dity of the claim. Sniadach "unleashed a barrage of due process
attacks on virtually every form of action, judicial or administrative,
in which summary proceedings without notice and hearing were
formerly permissible. '2 In addition to the wage garnishment, con-
fession of judgment, replevin and § 9-503 repossession developments
discussed herein, due process assaults have been made with varying
success on garnishment of bank accounts and seizure of an out-of-
state European defendant's property to compel his appearance and
pre-notice, pre-hearing seizure by innkeepers, landlords, warehouse-
men, repairmen, municipalities.3
Ir. STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL MATERIALS
§ 9-503, Secured Party's Right To Take Possession After
Default, of the Uniform Commercial Code provides:
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the
right to take possession of the collateral. In taking posses-
sion a secured party may proceed without judicial process
if this can be done without breach of the peace ...
The Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1 of the United States
Constitution provides, inter alia, no state shall:
...deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its ju-
risdiction the equal protection of the laws.
42 U.S.C. § 1983, Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights, provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
1. 395 U.S. 337 (1968).
2. Amran and Schulman, Annual Survey of Pennsylvania Legal De-
velopments-Civil Practice and Procedure, 45 PA. B. Ass'N. Q. 171 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Amran and Schulman].
3. See Hawkland, The Seed of Sniadach: Flower or Weed?, 78 CoM.
L.J. 245 (1973); Del Duca, Judicial Highlights, 5 U.C.C. L.J. 193 (1972); 6
U.C.C. L.J. 86, 288, 389 (1973-74); 7 U.C.C. L.J. 85 (1974).
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III. CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT
(a) Use In Seven States; Overmeyer and Swarb Cases
There are seven states (Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Ohio, Penn-
sylvania, Virginia and Wisconsin) that permit confession of judg-
ment to be used generally in consumer transactions and they have
been widely used only in Illinois, Ohio and Pennsylvania. D.H.
Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co.,4 contested the validity of the Ohio
statute and Swarb v. Lennox,5 contested the validity of the Penn-
sylvania statute.
Overmeyer had purchased refrigeration equipment from Frick.
After default on the original installment notice, the parties exe-
cuted a new note which contained a confession of judgment clause.
The Court held that the confession of judgment procedure was not
unconstitutional on its face, and that Overmeyer had effectively
waived its right to a notice and hearing. Overmeyer was held to
have "voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly waived its right to
notice and hearing."6  In so ruling the court noted that: (1) the
confession of judgment provision was negotiated and agreed to by
attorneys for both companies; (2) Overmeyer was a business con-
cern which had entered into a large number of contracts and notes;
(3) the contract was not one of adhesion and (4) the confession
of judgment provison was bargained for.
7
The Court stated: "Our holding of course is not controlling
precedent for other facts or other cases. For example, where the
contract is one of adhesion, where there is great disparity of bar-
gaining power and where the debtor receives nothing for the
cognovit provision, other legal consequences may ensue.",,
In Swarb v. Lennox,9 the court held the confession of judgment
procedure invalid as to debtors to whom credit was extended for
personal, family or household purposes if their income was $10,000
or less annually. In addition the court also held that the right to
notice and hearing could be effectively waived in all mortgage
transactions.
(b) Post-Swarb Pennsylvania Cases
Subsequent to Swarb, Egyptian Sands Real Estate v. Polony1 °
4. 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
5. 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
6. D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187 (1972).
7. Id. at 186-87.
8. Id. at 188.
9. 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
10. 222 Pa. Super. 315, 294 A.2d 799 (1972).
was decided. Pennsylvania requires a clearer manifestation of con-
sent to sustain a warrant of attorney to confess judgment than to
sustain a normal contract provision. In light of the attacks in the
courts on cognovit clauses on grounds of a denial of due process"
and in light of the susceptibility of Pennsylvania's cognovit proce-
dure to constitutional challenge, the Egyptian Sands court con-
cluded that it was essential that Pennsylvania continue its policy
of requiring a clear consent. '
2
Such consent was deemed lacking where: (1) defendant lessees
who were Hungarian immigrants and who spoke only broken
English did not read the confession of judgment provision in the
lease; (2) the lessor's attorney also acted as attorney for the lessee;
(3) the legal fees were assessed 50% to the lessor and 50% to the
lessees; and (4) various provisions of the lease in addition to the
confession of judgment clause set forth other onerous clauses and
waiver of lessee rights. 13 The court noted that Swarb held uncon-
stitutional as violative of due process Pennsylvania's entries of
judgment on warrants of attorney contained in leases and consumer
financing documents against natural persons residing in Pennsyl-
vania having yearly incomes of under $10,000 and having not been
shown to have understandingly, intentionally, and voluntarily
waived their rights. However, it concluded that the record in the
instant case did not permit a determination as to the applicability
of Swarb.'
4
Swarb was also held inapplicable in Yerger v. Clarke,1' where
one of two co-owners of the stock of a close corporation bought
the interest of the other for $5,000 and gave a judgment note signed
by himself and his wife to secure payment of the debt. The court
found the conjugal income of the husband and wife to be $12,220
in 1966, the year that the note was signed, and accordingly ruled
Swarb inapplicable on grounds that it applies only to lease or con-
sumer financing transactions where the individual or conjugal
income is less than $10,000. It further ruled that the basic question
of the constitutionality of the judgment by confession procedure
was not reached because of the withdrawal for a good consideration
and with prejudice by the makers of the note of their petition to
open judgment.
(c) Amendment To Pennsylvania Rules of Procedure
The Civil Procedural Rules Committee has decided that because
a matter far beyond practice and procedure is involved, the amend-
11. D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972); Swarb v.
Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
12. Egyptian Sands Real Estate v. Polony, 222 Pa. Super. 315, 322, 294
A.2d 799, 804 (1972).
13. Id. at 316-17, 322-23, 294 A.2d at 801-02, 804.
14. Id. at 322 n.9, 294 A.2d at 804 n.9.
15. 94 Montg. Co. L.R. 37 (Pa. C.P. 1971).
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ment to the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure Confession of
Judgment Rules should not deal with the fundamental policy ques-
tion of whether good consumer policy requires the abolition or
limitation of confession of judgment procedures.'"
The principal due process amendment deals only with the
observation of the Supreme Court in Overmyer v. Frick, that the
Pennsylvania procedure requiring a preponderance of the evidence
to open a judgment may impose an undue burden of proof upon
the defendant as contrasted to the Ohio procedure which requires
opening where evidence is presented which in a jury trial would
require submission to a jury. 17. Historically, under the Pennsyl-
vania rule, the defendant had the burden of persuading the court
to exercise its discretion to open the judgment and the appellate
courts would not reverse unless there had been an abuse of discre-
tion. The amendment to Rule 29591s changes this and adopts the
Ohio burden of proof which the Supreme Court found was not so
onerous or unduly burdensome as to violate due process.' 9
IV. REPLEVIN
The Supreme Court held in Fuentes v. Shevin and Parham v.
Cortese,20 that the Florida and Pennsylvania replevin with bond
statutes violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
because the debtor is given no opportunity to contest the creditor's
right to repossess before the collateral is taken by the sheriff, and
therefore has no opportunity to prevent even an unjustified repos-
session.21 This was a 4-3-2 decision with Justices Stewart, Douglas,
Brennan and Marshall forming the majority; Chief Justice Berger
and Justices White and Blackmun dissenting; and Justices Powell
and Rehnquist, the newest members of the court, not taking part
in the decision. These cases left untouched the replevin without
bond provision authorized by Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure
1072(b). Under this procedure there can be a determination of title
or right to possession without seizure.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court Civil Procedural Rules Com-
mittee has indicated that
[t] he Committee is considering possible amendments of the
Replevin Rules requiring all actions of replevin to be com-
menced as replevin without bond, with provisions for con-
16. Amran and Schulman at 167. See note 2 supra.
17. Id. at 168.
18. PA. R. Cv. P. 2959.
19. Amran and Schulman at 168.
20. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
21. Id. at 80-81.
version to replevin with bond upon notice and hearing at
any time prior to judgment.
In practice, the Committee has found that most actions
of replevin are now commenced without bond and the
issuance of the writ or filing of the complaint usually
results in either amicable disposition or an uncontested
judgment.
In situations where immediate possession is essential
the common pleas courts have been fashioning interim con-
stitutional due process procedures under our present rules,
consistent with Fuentes.
22
V. SECTION 9-503 SELF-HELP REPOSSESSION
(a) Overview of Litigation
Following in the wake of Fuentes v. Shevin, -' numerous chal-
lenges arose against the constitutionality of Uniform Commercial
Code, § 9-503. Six decisions24 have declared self-help repossession
under § 9-503 to be such state action as would render the statute
unconstitutional, and of the six, three have been overturned
recently by courts of appeals.25 Of the three remaining decisions,
one, Michel v. Rex-Noreco, Inc.,26 involved a hearing for a prelimi-
nary injunction against a creditor seeking repossession under § 9-
503. The preliminary injunction was granted, the court holding
that repossession under § 9-503 was state action. The case, however,
died at this point. A second pro-debtor decision, Boland v. Essex
County Bank & Trust Co.,2 7 likewise was never appealed. The
Boland court applied Fuentes against § 9-503 and held the provision
unconstitutional. The state action involved was the legislative
change of prior law by adopting § 9-503. The third decision, Watson
v. Branch County Bank,28 found that the debtor's property rights
22. Amran and Schulman at 172. See also Associated Financial Serv-
ices Co. v. Philson, 13 Crawford L.J. 40 (Pa. C.P. 1973); Pedriani v. McCaf-
ferty Ford, 69 Schuylkill L.R. 57 (Pa. C.P. 1973); Fretz v. Bechtelsville Ga-
rage, 65 Berks L.J. 149 (Pa. C.P. 1973).
23. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
24. Watson v. Branch County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Mich.
1974); Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d
1107 (3d Cir. 1974); Boland v. Essex County Bank & Trust Co., 361 F. Supp.
917 (D. Mass. 1973); Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972),
rev'd sub noam., Adams v. Southern California First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d
324 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 325 (1974); Michel v. Rex-
Noreco, Inc., Civ. No. (D. Vt., filed Nov. 1, 1972); James v. Pinnix,
Civ. No. 72J-250(n) (D. Miss., filed Feb. 14, 1973), rev'd, 495 F.2d 206 (5th
Cir. 1974).
25. Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d
1107 (3d Cir. 1974); Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972),
rev'd sub noa., Adams v. Southern California First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d
324 (9th Cir. 1973); James v. Pinnix, Civ. No. 72J-250(n) (D. Miss., filed
Feb. 14, 1973), rev'd, 495 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974).
26. Civ. No. (D. Vt., filed Nov. 1, 1972).
27. 361 F. Supp. 917 (D. Mass. 1973).
28. 380 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
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were "essential for the protection of human life and liberty," and
that §§ 9-503 and 9-504 were an integral part of a state enacted
scheme to regulate automobile purchase financing, thus constituting
"state action" depriving debtors of their property without due
process of law.
Several recent federal and state court decisions have held that
self-help repossession under § 9-503 is constitutional. Eleven court
of appeals decisions in six circuits, with the Supreme Court denying
certiorari in four cases, have declared § 9-503 to be valid under the
Constitution.29 A challenge to the validity of this provision as ap-
plied in Virginia was dismissed in federal district court for failure
to state a cause of action because self-help repossession is not made
"under color of law. 830  Several recent state court decisions have
also upheld the constitutionality of § 9-503.31
(b) Adams Case-The Argument for § 9-503 Self-Help Reposses-
sion
In Adams v. Southern California First National Bank,
2 the
Ninth Circuit ruled that self-help repossession by the creditor
(or by means of a private collection agency) of secured prop-
erty pursuant to the terms of the security agreement and in
accordance with Section 9-503 does not involve the "significant
type" of state action required to make applicable the due proc-
ess clause of the fourteenth amendment, which prohibits a state
from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law.
33
29. Shirley v. State Bank of Connecticut, 493 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1974);
Gibbs v. Titelman, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 5261
(1974); Brantley v. Union Bank & Trust, 498 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied. 95 S. Ct. 517 (1975); Caldron v. United Furniture Co., 505 F.2d 950
(5th Cir. 1974); James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974); Gary v.
Darnell, 505 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1974); Turner v. Impala Motors, 503 F.2d
607 (6th Cir. 1974); Nichols v. Tower Grove Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 404
(8th Cir. 1974); Nowlin v. Professional Auto Sales, 496 F.2d 16 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 328 (1974); Bichel Optical Lab v. Marquette Nat'l
Bank, 487 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1973); Adams v. Southern California First
Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973) (as modified on denial of rehear-
ing), rev'g Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), cert. denied,
95 S. Ct. 325 (1974).
30. McDuffy v. Worthmore Furniture, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 257 (E.D.
Va. 1974).
31. John Deere v. Catalano, - Colo. -, 525 P.2d 1153 (1974); King
v. South Jersey National Bank, 66 N.J. 161, 330 A.2d 1 (1974); Cook v.
Lilly, - W. Va. -, 208 S.E.2d 784 (1974); Kipp v. Cozens, 40 Cal. App.
3d 709, 115 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1974); A & S Excavating, Inc. v. International
Harvester Credit Corp., 31 Conn. Supp. 152, 325 A.2d 535 (Conn. Super.
1974).
32. 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973).
33. Id. at 329.
Although the debtor's action was brought under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, which forbids deprivation of rights under color of state law,
the court considered the "state action" required to be shown under
that statute to be the same as that required to bring the fourteenth
amendment into play. The court rejected the debtor's argument
that the requisite state action was established by the state's enact-
ment of Section 9-503. In so ruling the court stated:
The test is not state involvement, but rather is significant
state involvement. Statutes and laws regulate many forms
of purely private activity, such as contractual relations and
gifts, and subjecting all behavior that conforms to state law
to the Fourteenth Amendment would emasculate the state
action concept.
34
Noting that Section 9-503 was merely a codification of existing
prior statutory and common law empowering creditors to repossess
collateral without judicial process, the court also concluded that the
extensive Section 9-504 system of state regulation as to sale of
collateral, notice of sale requirements, application of proceeds, etc.,
did not constitute the "significant state involvement" required.
The court also concluded that Fuentes v. Shevin,35 was dis-
tinguishable from the instant case. In Fuentes the Court was deal-
ing with a state statute under which an action had been filed in
court, a writ formally issued, and service of the writ by a state
agent had occurred. The court chose not to interpret Fuentes "so
broadly that it encompasses all private actions between individuals
pursuant to their consensual undertakings.
'2 35a
A dissenting opinion in Adams concluded that Reitmen v.
Mulkey,"0 holding that a California constitutional amendment
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,
was applicable. In Reitman the California constitutional amend-
ment prohibited any limitation on the right of a person to rent or
sell his real property. It thereby permitted private racial discrimi-
nation in the housing market by repealing antidiscrimination
statutes and created a constitutional right to discriminate on racial
grounds. The dissent disagreed with the majority conclusion that
a distinction should be made between Reitman, where the state con-
stitutional amendment had been initiated for the purpose of author-
izing discrimination, which had previously been expressly pro-
hibited, and the self-help repossession cases, in which enactment
of Section 9-503 did not reverse the law as it had been prior to
the enactment of the Code, but merely codified existing law. The
dissent also discounted the majority's assertion that in Reitman,
California's "subjective intent" was to indirectly circumvent indi-
34. Id. at 330-31.
35. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
35a. 492 F.2d at 338.
36. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
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vidual constitutional rights and to encourage racial discrimination
in housing, whereas the complaining debtors in the Adams case
failed to show that the state harbored an insidious "subjective
intent" to violate their due process rights. It concluded that the
more relevant fact was that the state of California "deliberately
chose to follow a State policy of encouraging the repossession and
sale of collateral without a prior judicial hearing"3T by enacting
Sections 9-503 and 9-504 of the Commercial Code.
Since the Adams majority found no state action was present,
it did not reach the question whether repossession without prior
notice and hearing was a violation of debtors' due process rights.
The dissent, in addition to finding the requisite state action, con-
cluded that the procedure constituted a deprivation of due process
under Fuentes.
(c) Gibbs Case-The Argument Against § 9-503 Self-Help Repos-
sessions
Although the court of appeals in Gibbs v. Titelman38 upheld
the constitutionality of Section 9-503 thereby overruling the district
court decision 30 as one of the clearest and most thoroughly re-
searched arguments holding Section 9-503 self-help repossession un-
constitutional, the lower court's decision should be carefully con-
sidered.
In Gibbs, plaintiffs, representing a class of all those persons
in the Eastern Distict of Pennsylvania who are "installment
buyers" or "buyers" within the meaning of the Motor Vehicle Sales
Finance Act 40 and whose motor vehicles were summarily repos-
sessed, sought to have the state statutes41 permitting such a repos-
session without prior notice or hearing declared unconstitutional.
The class of defendants included all persons licensed under the
Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act as an "installment seller," "sales
finance company," or "collector-repossessor," and additionally any
banking institution which has loaned money for the purchase of
a motor vehicle in which a security interest was retained by the
bank.,
The district court found that the statutes permitting summary
37. Adams v. Southern California First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 340
(9th Cir. 1973).
38. 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1974).
39. Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
40. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §§ 623-27 (1965), as amended (Supp. 1974).
41. PA. STAr. ANN. tit. 12A, §§ 9-503 and 9-504 (1970); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 69, §§ 623-27 (1965), as amended (Supp. 1974).
repossession, without notice or opportunity for a hearing, of motor
vehicles sold under an installment sales contract by a creditor or
secured party who deemed the buyer to be in default were violative
of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and there-
fore unconstitutional.
In its ruling the court found that the suit was properly brought
in the district court because defendants' actions in repossessing
motor vehicles were performed "under the color of any State law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage" depriving a person
of a constitutional right to due process.
42
Defendants argued that self-help repossessions come from a
well established heritage in the common law which has precedential
value that exists notwithstanding the remedy's statutory codifica-
tion. The court concluded that although it is well settled that self-
help repossession has its ancestry in common law principles of dis-
tress, "what is not settled ...is that it ever was a sound historic
principle with any precedential value."48
Noting that man's natural impulse, upon being injured by
another is to punish the wrongdoer and compel him to make repara-
tion, the court conceded that self-help is one of the oldest principles
of law. However, it concluded that from the earliest recordation
of legal history, there were powerful efforts to check, guide and
ultimately eliminate extrajudicial distraint. Citing Street, The
Foundation of Legal Liability,44 the court noted restraints placed
on extra-judicial rights of seizure by creditors in the Roman, Teu-
tonic, Lombard, Bavarian, Ostrogoth and Visigothic systems of law.
The remedy had ceased to be an extrajudicial remedy in England
long before the Norman Conquest of 1066. It was only under the
system of feudalism that, as an alternative to the harshness of the
penalty of forfeiture of land by a tenant who had failed to perform
his feudal duties to his lord, distraint took on a new life as a means
of enabling the lord to enforce his claims to obtain services from
his tenant without resorting to the harshness of the forfeiture of
land penalty. In 1267 the Statute of Marlboro was the first attempt
in England at statutory regulation of distress. This was enacted
in response to outcries from tenants that the remedy was being
used as a means of oppression. The court suggested that this codifi-
cation of the remedy is perhaps a reason for its survival beyond
the decay of the system of feudal tenure and the subsequent
development of the law of assumpsit.
Historically only two types of distraint were categorized by
Blackstone and Holsworth.45 The court stated that nowhere in the
42. See 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3) (1962).
43. Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 45 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
44. 3 STREET, THB FOUNDATION OF LEGAL LIABILITY 280-90 (1906).
45. See 3 W. HOLSWORTH, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 281 (1923);
3 W. LEwIs, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 6, 7 (1898).
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common law does there exist a right of a distrainor to sell the goods
seized. The right to sell such goods is wholly a creature of
statute.4 It concluded therefore that ". . . the fact that a proce-
dure would pass muster under a feudal regime does not mean it
gives necessary protection to all property in its modern forms."47
The Gibbs decision notes that some courts have refused to find
the requisite state action under the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment or the "color of law" requirement of the 1964
Civil Rights Act in the self-help repossession cases on grounds that
the involvement of the state in the repossession scheme is only pas-
sive, and not significant. These courts make a distinction between
"passive state action" which exists where a statute merely allows
for a certain act of a private individual to occur, and "active" or
"direct" state action, which exists when the statute compels an
event, or a state official acts in concert or on behalf of an individual
in performing the act on which the complaint is based.
The court rejected this distinction between "passive" and
"active" or "direct" state action and found the requisite state action
stating:
When a statute or even a common law custom allows an
individual to unilaterally transcend the fundamental and
inalienable level of equality incident to all dealings between
people in this country, thai statute is clothing the individ-
ual with a power which can only truly be consistent with
the state. It is this power, given an individual by the state,
that constitutes 'state action'.48
The court at this point discussed Fuentes v. Shevin, which held
the replevin statutes of Pennsylvania and Florida unconstitutional
as previously noted.4 In Fuentes the Supreme Court criticized the
abdication of "effective state control over state power" by the
replevin statutes. Private parties
serving their own private advantage may unilaterally in-
voke state power to replevy goods from another. No state
official participates in the decision to seek a writ; no state
official reviews the basis for the claim to repossession; and
no state official evaluates the need for immediate seizure.
There is not even a requirement that the plaintiff provide
46. Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 47 n.15 (E.D. Pa. 1973) citing
3 W. LEwis, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARPES 6 n.16 (1898).
47. Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 47 (E.D. Pa. 1973) citing Snia-
dach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 377 (1968).
48. 369 F. Supp. at 48.
49. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); see notes 23-35 and accom-
panying text supra.
any information to the court on these matters. The state
acts largely in the dark.60
The court concluded that the state power of which the United
States Supreme Court spoke in the discussion of the replevin
statutes in Fuentes, as well as the self-help repossession statutes,
is not the power to have a deputy sheriff or constable act as the
creditor's collecting agency, but rather the power of the creditor
to decide unilaterally that his rights are greater than the debtors.
"This power has no less an impact on the person whose goods are
taken when the state does not compel that the power be used." 51
At this juncture in its opinion the court also relied on Hall
v. Garson,5 2 which held unconstitutional a distraint for rent by a
landlord. In that case the court stated ". . . the entry into
another's home and the seizure of another's property, was an act
that possessed many, if not all of the characteristics of an act of
the State. '53 The court concluded that even by merely permitting
self-help repossession, such permission is a license to perform a state
function and, as such, comes under the umbrella of the fourteenth
amendment.
The permissive nature of statutes allowing for self-help repos-
session of motor vehicles also constituted sufficient state action to
bring the matter within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. In
so ruling the court relied heavily in Reitman v. Mulkey. 54  In
Reitman as noted above, the court ruled that an amendment to the
California constitution which prohibited restrictions on an individ-
ual's right to sell property to whomever he chooses was unconstitu-
tional. Despite the fact that all parties were private individuals
and no state official or personnel were involved, the Supreme Court
of the United States found that the enactment of this section of
the California constitution encouraged and involved the state in
private discrimination.
In Gibbs, defendants argued that Reitman applied only to civil
rights cases involving racial discrimination because ". . . the his-
torical, legal and moral considerations fundamental to extending
federal jurisdiction to meet racial injustices are simply not present
in the instant case."55 The court rejected this argument concluding
that when Congress superseded the 1871 Civil Rights Act which was
established admittedly to counter the outrages committed by the
Ku Klux Klan against the Negro population in the South, it
broadened the language and purpose of the statute to encompass
a substantive remedy for violation of any constitutionally protected
right. It further stated:
50. 407 U.S. at 93.
51. Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 48 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
52. 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970).
53. 430 F.2d at 431.
54. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
55. Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 49 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
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Since Congress has chosen not to distinguish between con-
stitutionally protected rights in § 1983, this court can only
assume that the amount of state involvement necessary to
constitute 'color of state law' for a deprivation of one con-
stitutional right would equal the amount of state involve-
ment necessary for another constitutional right. 5 a
The court then cited a number of cases not involving racial
discrimination which have followed this theory and extended the
Reitman rational.56 The court also cited cases in which "a host
of state statutes which permitted summary seizure prior to notice
and hearing have been held constitutionally invalid.1
57
Interpreting contradictory economic and sociological evidence
of expert witnesses, the court found that the economic and social
impact of requiring notice and an opportunity for a hearing before
a seizure would not prevent extension of credit to low-income, high-
risk creditors. Nor would it cause these statutes to fall within an
exception to the notice requirement on grounds that the seizure
was necessary to secure an "important governmental or general
public interest."57 a The general public interest, as found by the
court, was the elimination of self-help repossession.
It was also found that because of the inequality of bargaining
power and the lack of an intelligent waiver, the plaintiffs did not
waive their due process rights by signing the installment sales con-
tracts containing provisions permitting the creditor or secured party
to repossess upon default.
VI. FORECLOSURE BY WAREHOUSEMAN UNDER § 7-210 SUSTAINED
Due process issues also have arisen regarding Article 7 of the
Code.
In Magro v. Lentini Bros. Moving & Storage Co.,5 s the court held
55a. Id.
56. Palmer v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973)
(private utility termination); Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970)
(landlord's distraint); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970)
(innkeeper's lien); Hill v. Toll, 320 F. Supp. 185 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (bail
bondsmen).
57. Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 50 (E.D. Pa. 1973) citing Fuen-
tes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (replevin); Lynch v. Household Finance
Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972) (garnishment of savings account); Bell v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535 (1971) (revocation of motor vehicle registration and driver's
license); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (cutoff of welfare rights);
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337 (1968) (gar-
nishment of wages); Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970) (landlord's
distraint); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (innkeeper
lien); Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Company, 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.
N.Y. 1970) (replevin).
57a. Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
58. 338 F. Supp. 464 (E.D. N.Y. 1971).
that procedures for enforcing a warehouseman's lien under U.C.C.
§ 7-210 did not violate due process requirements where a party
voluntarily surrendered goods to the warehouseman and these
goods were not so specialized such as wages, thereby creating a
deprivation which would drive a debtor "to the wall."
Magro, about to be evicted from his apartment, contracted with
Lentini Brothers for removal and storage of furniture. Payment
for these services not having been remitted, Lentini advised Magro
that the goods would be sold at public auction.
Magro, relying on the Supreme Court's ruling in Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp.,59 attacked the right to sell the goods before
a judicial determination was made.
The district court would not extend the Sniadach principles to
Section 7-210. The court found significant differences between
garnishment of wages in Sniadach and Section 7-210:
(1) Magro voluntarily delivered the goods to Lentini.
(2) Section 7-210 specifically requires notification of pro-
posed sale and bailor may then seek redress in the
courts.
(3) Goods relinquished for long periods of time are not the
"specialized type of property" such as wages to which
the Sniadach decision was directed.
The opposite conclusion was reached in Jones v. Banner Moving
& Storage, Inc.,60 which held that the warehouseman's lien statutes
[§§ 7-209, 7-210] are unconstitutional. The court distinguished §§
7-209, 7-210 from those statutes at issue in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant
Co.6 because here no provisions are made for any hearing or any
other form of judicial control.
VII. Mitchell CASE-U.S. SUPREME COURT RULES
THAT LOUISIANA SEQUESTRATION LAW MEETS
DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS
Distinguishing Fuentes, the Supreme Court in Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant Co.,6 2 held valid, in a 5 to 4 decision, a Louisiana statute
which did not provide for notice and hearing prior to seizure of
property in execution of the sequestration writ. The Louisiana
statute, (1) prior to seizure required the vendor-creditor to make
a sworn affidavit to a judge sufficient to enable him to make an
initial finding establishing the existence of the debt, the lien, and
the buyer's default and (2) gave the buyer-debtor the right to
appear before the judge and procure immediate dissolution of the
59. 395 U.S. 337 (1968).
60. Jones v. Banner Moving & Storage, Inc., No. , Spec. Term. Pt. I
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. August 12, 1974), as reported in UCC LAW LEr, Vol. 8,
No. 9 at 1 (Nov. 1974).




writ if the creditor could not then prove the grounds upon which
the writ was issued.
Mitchell arose upon the buyer-debtor's motion to dissolve a
sequestration writ. Seller had filed a claim for the unpaid balance
due under an installment contract for the purchase of consumer
goods. Alleging a vendor's lien under Louisiana law, the seller
requested a writ to sequester the goods pending the outcome of
the suit to prevent further impairment or disposition of his security.
The judge issued the writ, and the property was seized but without
giving the buyer notice or prior hearing. The statute and the writ
did provide that upon seizure, the debtor could appear before the
judge and procure immediate dissolution of the writ if the creditor
could not then prove the grounds upon which the writ was issued.
The buyer failed to appear for this purpose, but, relying on Fuentes,
subsequently filed his motion to dissolve on the basis that the pre-
judgment seizure violated his due process rights of notice and hear-
ing prior to repossession.
The majority63 held that "it comports with due process to
permit the initial seizure on sworn ex parte documents, followed
by the early opportunity to put the creditor to his proof."
6 4 It
noted that while the buyer had paid part of the purchase price of
the goods, his title was encumbered by the vendor's lien for the
balance of the purchase price, thus rendering his title subject to
immediate defeasance upon default. Both the buyer and the seller
had substantial interests in the property. Therefore, "resolution
of the due process question must take account not only of the
interests of the buyer of the property but those of the seller as
well."
6 5
Focusing on the statute itself, the majority noted that the writ
could not issue on the creditor's bare assertion of right. The
creditor's right to the writ must "clearly appear from specific facts,"
showing of which must be made per affidavit to a judge, and only
the judge could issue the writ.6 5a Further, the statute provided
safeguards for the debtor in that it entitled him to seek the im-
mediate dissolution of the writ which would be granted automat-
ically upon the creditor's failure to prove the grounds upon which
the writ was issued.
The statute was found to benefit both the secured seller and
the buyer-debtor. Repossession prevented the further corrosion of
63. The Mitchell majority consisted of Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist,
JJ. and Burger, C.J. The opinion was written by White, J.
64. 416 U.S. at 609.
65. Id. at 604.
65a. Id. at 605-06.
seller's security pendente lite by the defaulting buyer's continued
use. "The debtor, unlike the creditor, does not stand ready to make
the opposing party whole, if his possession, pending a prior hearing,
turns out to be wrongful. ' 66 In addition, the statute protected the
seller from the risk that the buyer might conceal the property or
sell it, whereupon the seller would lose his vendor's lien under
Louisiana law. 6 7 Prior notice would warn the bad faith debtor of
potential repossession, giving him the opportunity to quickly con-
ceal or sell the property.
The statute also benefited the debtor. As noted, it provided
for a dissolution hearing following execution of the writ. The
issues that the judge must determine in granting the writ--exist-
ence of the debt, the lien, and the buyer's default-"are ordinarily
uncomplicated matters that lend themselves to documentary
proof."67a The majority concluded that this minimizes the risk that
the writ would be issued wrongfully since the issues are "narrow
and readily determinable by the judge."
6 7b
The court analogized the sequestration procedure to prejudg-
ment attachment procedures. It distinguished Sniadich v. Family
Finance Corp.68 as involving wages (a "specialized type of prop-
erty"), deprivation of which would create undue hardship on the
debtor. Additionally, in Sniadach, the creditor had no prior
interest whatsoever in the attached property, and thus the present
situation, where the buyer and seller under an installment contract
both have substantial interests in the property, was not covered.
However, the court had to confront the precedent established by
Fuentes in which buyer and seller both had substantial interests
in the disputed property.
The majority distinguished Mitchell from Fuentes, stating that
the replevin statutes in Fuentes were held violative of due process
because repossession thereunder was "carried out without notice or
opportunity for hearing and without judicial participation."
''sa
Whereas in Fuentes replevin was authorized by a court clerk
upon the creditor's bare assertion of his right, the statute in
Mitchell allows repossession only upon issuance of a writ by a
judge after he makes an initial determination of the creditor's
right on a showing of his vendor's lien and the debtor's default.
The Mitchell majority reasoned that because these issues are readily
determinable, the risk of wrongful repossession is minimized. How-
ever, in Fuentes, the statute authorized repossession of any prop-
66. Id. at 608.
67. Louisiana has not enacted the Uniform Commercial Code; under
Louisiana law the vendor's lien is lost upon disposition of the collateral.
See 416 U.S. at 609.
67a. 416 U.S. at 609.
67b. Id. 609-10.
68. 395 U.S. 337 (1968).
68a. 416 U.S. at 615.
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erty "wrongfully detained.' 'OSb This kind of "broad fault standard"
is "inherently subject to factual determination and adversarial in-
put," unlike the confined standard under the Louisiana statute.6 80
A further distinction was made by the Mitchell majority in that
in Fuentes the party seeking the writ was not required to initiate
court action, while the Louisiana sequestration was supplementary
to the creditor's action on the debt and explicitly provided for a
hearing on the seller's right to repossess. The court noted that due
process does not mandate that the debtor be allowed to retain
possession until all issues have been judicially resolved. It ruled
that preliminary resolution of possessory rights by the judiciary
could fulfill due process requirements.Sd
Justice Stewart's dissent69 asserted that Fuentes should control.
The Louisiana statute basically allowed repossession based on the
creditor's ex parte allegations While there might be some pro-
cedural differences in the implementation of the Mitchell and
Fuentes statutes, such differences were deemed to make no consti-
tutional difference. Reliance by the majority on the judicial par-
ticipation in issuing the writ and the "narrow, readily determinable
issues" was not deemed to be a basis for distinguishing Fuentes.
The dissent noted that the Louisiana procedure is still based on
ex parte allegations which are "no substitute for a hearing." Even
with judicial participation, this procedure could only determine the
formal sufficiency of the creditor's petition. Moreover, the Louisi-
ana statute required issuance of the writ by a judge only in New
Orleans parish, where this case arose. In the rest of the state, the
writs could be issued by a court clerk as in Fuentes. As for the
"narrow issues" argument, Justice Stewart noted that Fuentes had
said that the complexity or simplicity of issues is not relevant in
determining whether prior hearing is required. He therefore con-
cluded that on the basis of Fuentes, the Louisiana sequestration
statutes were unconstitutional and interpreted the majority's deci-
sion as essentially overruling Fuentes. Justice Stewart added, "A
substantial departure from precedent can only be justified, I had
thought, in the light of experience with the application of the rule
to be abandoned or in the light of an altered historic environment.
. . . The only perceivable change that has occurred since the
68b. Id. at 617.
68c. Id.
68d. Id. at 612.
69. Stewart, J. was joined by Douglas and Marshall, JJ.; Brennan, J.
joined the dissent in part.
Fuentes case is in the makeup of this Court."' 0
Discussion and litigation will continue as to whether Mitchell
distinguished, or directly or tacitly overruled Fuentes. Fuentes
appears to have been interpreted narrowly by the majority to cover
only those statutes allowing repossession without notice and prior
hearing, and without judicial participation in the authorization of
the repossession. We may also expect considerable speculation on
how the Mitchell decision may affect the outcome of a Supreme
Court decision on the issue of self-help repossession under Section
9-503.
The constitutionality of repossession per Section 9-503 with the
aid of state officials where the possibility of a breach of the peace
requires use of such a procdure has apparently not yet been liti-
gated or reported. The majority opinion stresses that the Louisiana
statute contained built-in debtor protection by at least allowing for
a preliminary judicial review prior to seizure and an early post-
seizure hearing, thereby minimizing the risk and effects of wrongful
issuance. In addition, it stated:
We are advised by counsel for petitioners of a tide of cases
following Fuentes and are cautioned that affirmance in this
case would set off a rip tide with considerable con-
sequences. We perceive no such result. Our decision here
will not affect recent cases dealing with garnishment or
summary self-help remedies of secured creditors or land-
lords. 71
The Mitchell majority in effect differentiated a statutory
repossession scheme, especially one allowing for judicial participa-
tion, from a creditor's summary self-help. Of interest is the obser-
vation of the Mitchell majority that "the uncertainty evident in
the current debate over the constitutionality of self-help reposses-
sion under Section 9-503 suggests caution in the adoption of an in-
flexible constitutional rule. '72 The 5 to 4 and 4 to 3 majorities in
Mitchell and Fuentes require us to await further decisions by the
Supreme Court on the Section 9-503 controversy.
To find a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause, three questions must be answered affirmatively:
1. Was there sufficient "state action"?
2. Has the debtor been deprived of "life, liberty or property"?
3. If the debtor has been so deprived, was the deprivation "with-
out due process"?
Thus far, the decisions upholding the constitutionality of § 9-503
have focused only on the threshold question of "state action."
Finding that the "state action" requirement was not met, they ap-
propriately have declined to rule on the "life, liberty, or property"
70. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 635 (1974).
71. Id. at 620 n.14.
72. Id. at 618 n.13.
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and "due process" issues. However, following the Mitchell case,
if the "state action" issue is hurdled, the debtor may have an easier
task in having the remaining two questions resolved in his favor.
In Mitchell the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the creditor.
However, it recognized that the debtor has a substantial interest
in the property subject to repossession, although this interest may
be defeasible upon default in payments. Moreover, in Mitchell due
process was ruled to require: (1) preliminary judicial review of
the creditor's claim prior to seizure; and (2) an early post-seizure
hearing upon request of the debtor. Unilateral determination by
the creditor that default had occurred and retention of possession
by the creditor without an opportunity for the debtor to have an
immediate hearing, were not permissible.
Thus, in light of these pro-debtor aspects of the Mitchell case,
the single bar to successful attacks on the constitutionality of § 9-
503 would seem to be the lack of the requisite "state action." It
will therefore not be surprising if continued attacks of self-help
§ 9-503 repossession attempt to develop new theories of what consti-
tutes "state action" in this situation.
Debtors will increasingly attempt to meet the more modest
"state action" requirement under the "civil-human rights" measure
of state action utilized by the United States Supreme Court in
Reitman v. Mulkey 73 and Moose Lodge v. Irvis74 pursuant to which
enactment of a state constitutional amendment or legislation or
adoption of regulations which have the effect of violating "civil-
73. 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (see notes 34-35 and accompanying text supra).
74. In Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), the United States
Supreme Court held that the operation of the regulatory scheme enforced
by the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, including the licensing of a local
Moose Lodge to serve liquor, did not sufficiently implicate the state in the
Lodge's discriminatory guest policies so as to make the regulation and li-
censing "state action" which would violate the United States Constitution's
fourteenth amendment requirement that no state "shall deprive any person
of the equal protection of the laws." However, the decision also held that
plaintiff, a Black who had been denied guest eating privileges because of
his race, was entitled to a decree enjoining the enforcement of a regulation
promulgated by the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board requiring the local
lodge to comply with the provisions of its national organization's constitu-
tion and by-laws imposing discriminatory membership rules and guest poli-
cies. The court noted that this regulation was promulgated with the lauda-
ble intent of insuring that private club licenses would be issued to licensees
who would retain their private club characteristics. However, the regula-
tion was nevertheless held invalid insofar as it required the local lodge to
comply with portions of the organization's national constitution and by-
laws containing "racially discriminatory provisions." In so ruling the court
stated: "State action, for purposes of the equal protection clause, may em-
anate from rulings of administrative and regulatory agencies as well as
from legislative or judicial action." 407 U.S. at 179.
human rights" were deemed sufficient state action to make the
fourteenth amendment equal protection clause applicable.
One such attempt is indicated by the opinion in Watson v.
Branch County Bank.75 There, the court, citing Reitman, Moose
Lodge and Shelley v. Kraemer76 elevated "property" rights under
the circumstances to the status of human or civil rights, stating
that property "is important and essential insofar as it is essential
for the protection of human life and liberty and for the advance-
ment of happiness." 77 Thus "state action" was found by the state's
enacting a statute, § 9-503, which by allowing for the deprivation
of property without due process, violated the debtor's essential
human rights of life, liberty and happiness.
The Watson court also found sufficient state action in motor
vehicle repossessions through the activities of the Secretary of State
who controlled the title certificate procedure. It noted that the
Secretary of State not only indicated security interests on the title
certificates, but also issued new certificates to purchasers of the
repossessed collateral at § 9-504 resales, thus effectively ratifying
the creditor's seizure pursuant to § 9-503. This activity, the court
said, is qualitatively the same as the clerical activities in Fuentes
which were found by the Supreme Court to constitute state action.
It should be noted, however, that Turner v. Impala Motors,7 8
holding that no sufficient state action can be found in the self-help
repossession situation, was decided by the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals on September 20, 1974 shortly after the August 12, 1974
Watson decision in one of the districts of the Sixth Circuit. At
the time of this writing a notice of appeal to the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals had nevertheless been filed in the Watson case.
VIII. North Georgia Finishing CASE--U.S. SUPREME COURT
RULES THAT GEORGIA GARNISHMENT STATUTE DOES NOT
MEET DUE PROcEss REQUIREMENTS
In the recent case of North Georgia Finishing Inc. v. Di-Chem,
Inc.7 9 the United States Supreme Court held (6-3, majority opinion
by White, J.) that Georgia's garnishment statute 0 violates the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment and is therefore in-
valid because:
75. 380 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
76. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
77. Watson v. Branch County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945, 968 (W.D. Mich.
1974).
78. 503 F.2d 607 (6th Cir. 1974). In Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948), the United States Supreme Court refused to enforce a restrictive
housing covenant which excluded Negroes from the neighborhood in viola-
tion of their fourteenth amendment equal protection rights.
79. 95 S. Ct. 719 (1975).
80. Ga. Code Ann. § 46-101. See North Georgia Finishing, Inc., v. Di-
Chem, Inc., 95 S. Ct. at 720 n.1 for the text of the statute.
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(1) the debtor is not given notice of the pending garnishment;
(2) the writ of garnishment is issued upon the affidavit of the
plaintiff or his attorney without any judicial review
thereof;
(3) the affidavit need contain only conclusory allegations;
(4) the garnishee is deprived of the use of the property pend-
ing the litigation unless he files a bond to regain interim
rights to the property; and
(5) there is no provision for an early hearing on the propriety
of the garnishment."'
Mitchell v. Grant12 was distinguished in North Georgia pri-
marily on the grounds that the Louisiana Law in Mitchell pro-
vided for judicial participation in the issuance of a writ of sequestra-
tion and also provided, without the filing of a bond, for an early
hearing to determine the propriety of the sequestration.8 3
The "state action" requisite for application of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was correctly presumed to be
fulfilled, and not addressed by the Court in its opinion in North
Georgia, because garnishment patently involves "state action."
However, the court's consideration of the previously discussed
"life, liberty, or property" and "due process" requirements which
must be met in applying the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause are of pervasive importance to the whole subject of creditor-
debtor relations as well as Code § 9-503.
Justice White's opinion squarely addressed the question of
whether Sniadach should be interpreted as merely invalidating a
statute permitting the garnishment of wages without notice and an
opportunity for a hearing. Under this interpretation Sniadach
would be considered merely as an exception in favor of wage earners
from the general rule of the legality of garnishment statutes. How-
ever, Justice White rejected this narrow interpretation. 4 Moreover,
his majority opinion did not even limit the application of Sniadach
to protection of essential consumer-household property interests,
a position which some observers had reached after the Supreme
Court decisions in Fuentes and Mitchell. Instead, the majority
stated:-
Respondent also argues that neither Fuentes nor Mitchell
is apposite here because those cases dealt with the applica-
81. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 719, 722-
23 (1975).
82. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
83. 95 S. Ct. at 722.
84. Id.
tion of due process protections to consumers who are vic-
tims of contracts of adhesion and who might be irreparably
damaged by temporary deprivation of household necessities,
whereas this case deals with its application in the commer-
cial setting to a case involving parties of equal bargaining
power. . . . It may be that consumers deprived of house-
hold appliances will more likely suffer irreparably than cor-
porations deprived of bank accounts, but the probability of
irreparable injury in the latter case is sufficiently great so
that some procedures are necessary to guard against the risk
of initial error. We are no more inclined now than we have
been in the past to distinguish among different kinds of
property in applying the Due Process Clause. Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S., at 89-90.1 5
In North Georgia, the Court held that a corporate bank account
is entitled to potection against garnishment issued by a court clerk
without notice or opportunity for an early hearing and without par-
ticipation by a judicial officer and with the filing of a counter-bond
as the only procedure by which the garnishee could reclaim the
property during pendency of the litigation on the alleged debt.8s
In so holding, the Supreme Court has dramatically indicated its in-
tent to apply the Sniadach limitations on pre-notice, pre-hearing,
pre-judgment seizure of assets to commercial as well as consumer
transactions.8 7 The dissent, written by Blackmun, J. (joined by
Rehnquist, J., and Burger, C.J.), alluded to the distinction made in
D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co.88 and Swarb v. Lennox 9 by the
Supreme Court in upholding confession of judgment procedures in
commercial transactions and invalidating them in certain consumer
transactions." However, the majority did not deem these distinc-
tions to be applicable in the instant case."1
The majority also rejected argument that because the debtor
was deprived of only the use and possession of the property, and
perhaps only temporarily, the due process clause was not violated.
9 2
In so doing, it quoted from Fuentes: "The Fourteenth Amendment
draws no bright lines around three-day, 10-day, or 50-day depriva-
tions of property. Any significant taking of property by the State
is within the purview of the Due Process Clause. '93 The North
Georgia court further stated, "Because the official seizures had been
carried out without notice and without opportunity for a hearing or
other safeguard against mistaken repossession, they were held to be
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
'94
85. Id. at 723 (emphasis added).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
89. 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
90. 95 S. Ct. at 729 (dissenting opinion).
91. Id. at 723.
92. Id. at 722.
93. Id. (quoting from Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972)).
94. 95 S. Ct. at 723.
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The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart, who as noted
above had vigorously dissented in the Mitchell case, is unsurpassed
for its brevity and -conciseness. His North Georgia concurring
opinion, in its entirety, is as follows:
It is gratifying to note that my report of the demise of Fuen-
tes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, see Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,
416 U.S. 600, 629-636, seems to have been greatly exaggerat-
ed. Cf. S. Clemens, Cable from Europe to the Associated
Press, reprinted in II A. Paine, Mark Twain: A Biography
1039 (1912).5
IX. PROPOSED STATUTORY CHANGES
Some new statutory developments are worth noting in connec-
tion with this review. Section 3.306 of the Uniform Consumer
Credit Codegsa recently promulgated by the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws would prohibit use
of confessions of judgment with respect to Consumer Credit Trans-
actions. In addition, the interpretive regulation of the recently
enacted Federal Truth in Lending Act gives a right of rescission
within three business days following the execution of a credit
instrument authorizing confession of judgment, if a security in-
terest in the creditor's residence is involved. This result is reached
under the § 226.2(z) definition of "security interest" of Regulation
Z issued pursuant to the Truth in Lending Act. The Act itself
gives a credit customer the right to cancel credit transactions within
three business days following agreement where a security interest
is retained or acquired in any real property which is used or
expected to be used as the customer's principal residencef 6
Also relevant are two model acts drafted by the National Con-
sumer Law Center-National Consumer Act, §§ 5-206 to 5.208 (1970),
and Model Consumer Credit Act, § 7.205 (1972). Similar legislation
is endorsed in the Report of the National Commission on Consumer
Finance.'
The Commercial Law League of America recently approved two
Model Prejudgment Remedy Statutes. The first, a short form, al-
ready enacted by Connecticut"s superimposes a prejudgment hear-
ing and notice provision over existing state procedures and does
95. Id. at 723.
95a. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 3.306 (1974 final draft).
96. This subject has been considered in detail by Hugh Chairnoff and
Max Klass, Truth in Lending-The Administrative View, 41 PA. B. Ass'N.
Q. 43, 51-53 (1969).
97. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMIsISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CON-
SUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 30-31 (1972).
98. See Connecticut Substitute House Bill #9237, Pub. Act. No. 73-431C ).
not change such procedures except as they relate to prejudgment
remedies. Its application is restricted to attachments, foreign
attachments, garnishments and replevins, and vests the plaintiff
with the right to obtain a temporary restraining order pending a
hearing on the appropriateness of the prejudgment remedy. The
other is primarily intended for states where the writs of foreign
attachment and replevin were obtained without hearing and spells
out in more elaborate fashion the means by which a creditor may
invoke a prejudgment remedy prior to a full trial on the merits.
This statute applies only to commercial transactions and does not
make prejudgment remedies available for use against consumers.
One feature of the statute is a provision for a waiver of rights if
contracts are drafted in accordance with its provisions. In such
a case, preliminary judicial inquiry is limited to whether the con-
tract complies with those provisions and whether the debtor has
signed the waiver.99
Some of the above statutory proposals were made prior to the
United States Supreme Court decisions in Mitchell and North
Georgia Finishing. Continuing evaluation of these legislative pro-
posals in light of those decisions will be necessary.
X. CONCLUSION
Pre-notice, pre-hearing and pre-judgment seizure of assets pur-
suant to statutory provisions involving state action will be consti-
tutional where, as indicated in Mitchell and North Georgia Finish-
ing, the statute adequately guarantees due process by requiring
a procedure such as preliminary judicial review of the proposed
seizure coupled with a right to an immediate hearing on the merits
at which the debtor, upon failure of the creditor to justify the initial
seizure, may have the seizure immediately dissolved. However,
these constitutional limitations do not apply to self-help repossession
under UCC §9-503 unless that procedure is determined to involve
the requisite degree of state action.
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